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Consumer Class Actions In California:
A Practical Approach To The
Problem Of Notice

The class action device was developed by the courts of equity as a
method of joinder,' and has achieved recognition by California courts
as a "valuable medium of litigation."' By allowing numerous plaintiffs
to assert their common claim in a single suit, the class action serves
a number of purposes,3 which were expressly recognized by the California Supreme Court in Daarv. Yellow Cab Co.4 . The class action is
a valuable method of securing redress for numerous plaintiffs with small
individual damages, who might otherwise lack the individual financial
ability to seek individual remedies. In addition, this device serves as
a means of punishment and deterrence for the wrongdoing defendant
by recovering from him all of the benefits accrued from his illegal activity, and aids legitimate businesses and the public by curtailing illegitimate and fraudulent business practices. 5 Finally, the class action serves
to protect the interests of the judicial system by lessening the threat of
multiplicity of litigation arising from a transaction common to all class
members.6
The purposes served by the class action suit are especially important
in the area of consumer actions, where consumers exposed to illegal
business practices often lack the individual economic power to control
deceptive sellers. The importance of the consumer class action as a
remedy and a deterrent was emphasized by the California Supreme
Court in Vasquez v. SuperiorCourt.7 In that case, the court stated that
1. Foster, The Status of Class Action Litigation, AM. D. FouND. No. 4 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Foster].
2. LaSala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 883, 489 P.2d 1113,
1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 862 (1971).
3. Comment, Civil Procedure-ClassActions-Amending Rule 23 in Response to
Eisen v. Carlisle & .Tacquelin, 53 N.C. L. REv. 40% 416 (1974).
4. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967).
5. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971).
6. Id.; 67 Cal. 2d at 714-15, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
7. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796.
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alternative methods of multiple litigation, such as joinder, intervention,
and consolidation, are insufficient remedies for the average consumer,
since use of such alternatives requires "agroup of economically powerful parties who are obviously able and willing to take care of their own

interests individually through individual suits or individual decisions
about joinder or intervention."8
Despite the widespread interest in class action suits, the only statutory authority for such suits in California prior to 1970 was contained
in Section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides in part:
[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest,
of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all.

Further statutory authority for consumer class actions was provided in
1970, when the California Legislature enacted the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act.9 A portion of that Act, Section 1781 (a) of the Civil
Code, states:
Any consumer entitled to bring an action under Section 1780 may,
if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage to
other consumers similarly situated, bring an action on behalf of
himself and such other consumers to recover damages or obtain
other relief as provided for in Section 1780.10
8. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800, citing Dolgow v. Anderson
43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
9. CAL. STATs. 1970, c. 1550, §1, at 3157.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §1780 provides:
(a) Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by
Section 1770 may bring an action against such person to recover or obtain any
of the following:
(1) Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of damages in
a class action be less than three hundred dollars ($300).
(2) An order enjoining such methods, acts or practices.
(3) Punitive damages.
(4) Any other relief which the court deems pro per.
(b) Such action may be commenced in the county in which the person against
whom it is brought resides, has his principal place of business, or is doing business, or in the county where the transaction or any substantial portion thereof
occurred.
If within any such county there is a municipal or justice court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, established in the city and county or judicial district
in which the person against whom the action is brought resides, has his principal place ofportion
business,
or isoccurred,
doing business,
or court
in which
theproper
transaction
or any
substantial
thereof
then such
is the
court for
the
for theintrial
trial
of jurisdiction
such action.of the
court court
Otherwise,
any municipal
is the proper
or justice
suchthereof.
county
subject matter
having
In any action subject to the provisions of this section, concurrently with the
filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit stating facts showing
c ounty or judicial district described
m
that the action has been
in this section as a proper place for the trial of the action.

If a plaintiff fails
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Section 1781 also sets forth procedural guidelines which vest great discretion in the court,'1 indicating that the legislature recognized the
desirability of giving the trial court flexibility in dealing with the problems that arise in maintaining consumer class actions. 2
In addition to the California statutory provisions for class action suits,
the California Supreme Court has also suggested that the trial courts
may employ Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
event of a procedural "hiatus."'13 Although the California courts are
not bound by the rule per se,'4 the California Supreme Court has recognized its utility in some situations.' 5 Nevertheless, the court has refrained from flatly requiring observance of the rule in all instances,' 6
perhaps in the realization that Rule 23, as construed, tends to diminish
7
the efficacy of the class action device.'
In summary, the class action trial court has basic statutory authority
for the maintenance of a class action from Section 382 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, but this section contains no procedural requirements.
Section 1781 of the Civil Code, which may be adopted by the trial court
in other than consumer actions,' contains procedural guidelines which
vest great discretion in the court to carefully consider the circumstances
and decide the procedural requirements for each case on a pragmatic
basis. The courts may also refer for procedural guidance to Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the fact that
neither the California Supreme Court nor the California Legislature has
placed mandatory procedural requirements on the trial courts for use
in class action suits indicates that both are continuing to "rely upon the
ability of trial courts to adopt innovative procedures which will be fair
to the litigants and expedient in serving the judicial process."' 9
Innovative procedures are especially important when the court is
determining whether the judgment in a consumer class action should
be binding on all class members and, if so, the procedural devices by
which a binding effect can be achieved. This problem has acquired
increasing importance, since the federal courts have apparently taken
to file the affidavit required by this section, the court shall, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, dismiss any such action without prejudice.
11. See CAL. CIv. CODE §1781(d); see text accompanying notes 136-140 infra
12. See 4 Cal. 3d at 821, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
13. Id.
14. Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 970 n.16, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376,
383 n.16 (1975).
15. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977-78, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809-10.
16. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 970 n.16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.16.
17. See text accompanying notes 44-49 infra.
18. See 4 Cal. 3d at 820, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809; Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1014, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485, 490 (1974).
19. 4 Cal. 3d at 821, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
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the view that a class action may not proceed unless the judgment will
bind all class members. 20 However, requiring individual notice to each
class member in a consumer class action for the purpose of ensuring
a res judicata judgment will probably result in defeat of the action prior
to trial, since the financial burden of such notice is likely to overwhelm
a plaintiff consumer who has sustained relatively small individual
damages.
This comment will initially discuss the statutory notice 21 and due
process2 2 requirements which must be satisfied if the judgment is to be
binding on absentee class members in a class action brought in federal
courts. In addition to the federal requirement of individual notice in
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, adequate representation will be considered not only as an inherent due process requirement, but also as a
possible means of ensuring that the judgment will be binding even if
individual notice is not given to all members of the class.
The second section will consider the approach of the California
courts to the problem of ensuring binding judgments in consumer class
actions, in the absence of express notice requirements in California statutes authorizing class actions. Again, adequate representation will be
considered as a means of ensuring that the due process requirements
have been fulfilled, allowing the judgment to be extended to absentee
class members.
In the final section, this comment will contend that the trial court's
primary consideration should not be the binding effect of the final judgment at all, since the danger of multiple litigation arising if the judgment does not bind the entire class is so slight as to be essentially nonexistent. Rather, it will be argued, the California courts should look
to the purposes underlying the class action device and allow the action
to proceed where those purposes are served, even though all members
may not be bound by the final judgment.
Since federal due process requirements are obligatory on the state
courts, and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has persuasive effect, it may be useful to begin the discussion with an analysis
of class actions in the federal courts.
20. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1973).
21. Fmn. R. Civ. PRoc. 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class; FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 23 (c) (2) requires that in
a class action maintained under 23(b)(3), the class action most typical of consumer
class actions, the court shall direct the best notice practicable under the circumstances to
the members of the class, including individual notice to all members identifiable through
reasonable effort.
22. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).

1976 / Consumer Class Actions
FEDERAL NoTicE. REQUIREMENTS

A.

OriginalRule 23 Class Designations

Prior to its 1966 amendment, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure distinguished between three types of class actions, each with
its own specific binding effect on the class members. An analysis of
the pre-1966 rule may be helpful to an understanding of the present
requirements.
The types of class actions established by the 1938 rule were designated "true," "hybrid," and "spurious." A "true' class action was one
involving a right which was joint or common, or derivative, "2 in which
the plaintiffs had an undivided interest in a single claim.2 4 Thus,
adjudication of the claim would effectively determine the rights of all

parties, whether or not the parties were individually before the court.
The "true" class action was the only one in which, if the representation
were adequate, the entire class was bound by the judgment,2 5 whether

or not the individual members joined in the action.
The "hybrid" action was one in which all class members had an interest in the specific property before the court,28 much in the manner of
A judgment in this action
an in rem or quasi in rem action at law.
would determine all rights of all parties to the property, thus binding

absentees and parties before the court alike as to that property.28
However, as to any other issues before the court, the judgment would
bind only those parties who actually participated in the action.29
The "spurious" action was the one in which the class members were
loosely bound, in that their claims against the defendant were "several,"
23. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
Preliminury Draft, 25 GEo. LJ. 551, 572-73 (1937) [hereinafter ctied as Moore].
24. Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adjudications to
Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1002, 1004 (1970-71).
An example of a "joint" right would be a suit by or against A, B, and C as representatives of an unincorporated association. Some writers attempted to limit the
"true" class suit to controversies involving property, while others extended it to include
personal liability. See Moore, supra note 23, at 527-73 & n.70. An example of a
"common" right would be a right given to creditors to enforce the statutory liability of
bank stockholders. An example of a derivative right would be a suit by A, B, and C as
shareholders against a corporation and directors. The primary right sought to be
enforced by A, B, and C belongs to the corporation; but the corporation's failure to
enforce it against the controlling directors gives A, B, and C the right, on behalf of all
shareholders, to enforce the primary right. Moore, supra note 23, at 572-73.
25. Moore, supra note 23, -at 573.
26. See Kaplan,'Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAV. L REV. 356, 377-78 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Kaplan].
An example of a 'hybrid" class action is a suit by creditors against a corporate
defendant, or a suit by a stakeholder against defendant claimants to determine the rights
of all defendants in the property held by the stakeholder. Moore, supra note 23, at 574.
27. Foster, supra note 1, at 21.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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but involved a common question of law or fact.80 This type of action
has been referred to as merely an expansion of the "permissive joinder"
device,31 in which a judgment bound only those parties who intervened
in the action prior to a determination of the merits, thus preserving
mutuality of judgment by avoiding one-way intervention of plaintiffs
after a judgment favorable to the class. 32 For this reason, the "spurious" class action was criticized as lessening the social utility of the class
action device, since multiplicity of litigation was not avoided unless
individual class members took affirmative steps to intervene in the
action.33 Few plaintiffs would voluntarily join in an action in which
the outcome was uncertain and where the possibility existed that they
would be bound by an unfavorable judgment and liable for costs of the
litigation. Therefore, if the outcome of the action were favorable to
the class, there was a distinct possibility of further actions since the nonintervening plaintiffs, not bound by the judgment in the prior action,
would be encouraged to bring their own actions after others similarly
situated had managed to recover against the defendant. It should be
recalled that the real effectiveness of a class action lies not merely in
facilitating recovery of damages by individual plaintiffs, but also in
requiring the defendant to give up the gains of his wrongful activity."
The judgment in a "spurious" class action served only the first goal,
that of recovery by individual plaintiffs. The second goal was not realized until all the plaintiffs injured by the defendant had taken the initiative either by intervening or by bringing their own separate actions.
B.

Amended Rule 23 Requirements

The conceptual distinctions between "true," "hybrid," and "spurious"
actions created difficulties in application,3" and in 1966 Rule 23 was
amended to abolish these categories. In place of the old categories,
30. An example of a spurious class action is a suit in which A, B, and C sue the
defendant for damage resulting from defendant's tortious act. If X suffered damage
resulting from the same act (i.e. the questions of law or fact are common to X as well as
to A, B, and C), X could join in the action, and the judgment would bind A, B, C, and X
as to the liability of the defendant. However, if X did not join in the action brought by
A, B, and C, he would not be bound and could proceed independently against the
defendant. Moore, supra note 23 at 574-76.
31. Foster, supra note 1, at 21-22.
32. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment,
32 ILL. L. Rnv. 555, 561-62 (1937-38).
33. Kalvin & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CH.
L. REv. 684, 711 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Kalvin and Rosenfield].
34. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 714-15, 433
P.2d 732, 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 738 (1967).
35. Foster, supra note 1, at 21-23; Kalvin and Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 707 &
n.73; 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966).
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the amended rule now sets forth the following requirements for maintenance of the action as a class action:
(a) ...One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.36
In the case of typical consumer class actions which seek damages rather
than injunctive or declaratory relief, Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that
(1) the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting the members individually,
and that (2) a class action be superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.37
Rule 23(b)(3) is similar to the former "spurious!' action since both
are based on plaintiffs' rights which are separate and distinct and yet
involve a common question of law or fact,"8 and thus the amended section presents the same problems as to the imposition of judgment binding on absentee class members. In attempting to meet this problem,
the drafters of Rule 23, considering the dictates of procedural due
process, 9 decided to mandate notice to class members, 40 forcing those
who wish exclusion from the judgment to "opt out." This mandate,
contained in Rule 23(c)(2),41 is an apparent reversal of the old Rule
23 requirement that class members must intervene in order to be bound
by the judgment in a "spurious" action.4 The rule now requires positive action by absentees in order to avoid being bound by the judgment.43 While theoretically a solution to the problem of ensuring a
36. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 23(a).
37. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 23(b)(3).
38. Rule 23(b)(3) actions, like the "spurious" class actions, encompass a loose
collection of plaintiffs with no pre-existing relationship, and federal class action trial
courts face the same problem of imposing a binding judgment on all members of the class
as was faced with the "spurious" class actions. See Dam, Class Action Notice: Who
Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. RFv. 97, 116-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dam].
39. See 39 F.RLD. at 99.
40. FED. R. CIv. PRoc. 23(c) (2).
41. FED. L Crv. PROC. 23(c)(2):
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
42. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
43. FED. . Civ. Poc. 23(c)(3):
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binding judgment, -the requirement for individual notice in Rule
23(b)(3) actions has raised practical difficulties, since the representative plaintiff with a small individual claim may be required to bear the
financial burden of notice to a huge class or, alternatively, face dismissal
of the action.
C. Eisen Notice Requirements: Due Process Mandate or Interpretation of Rule 23?
The leading case construing the Rule 23(c)(2) notice requirement
for Rule 23(b)(3) actions is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.a In that
case, Eisen brought a class action under Rule 23 on behalf of himself
and all similarly situated odd-lot traders on the New York Stock
Exchange for a certain period, charging the defendant brokerage firms
with violating the antitrust and securities laws by monopolizing odd-lot
trading and setting the odd-lot differential, a surcharge imposed on
odd-lot investors in addition to the standard brokerage commission, at
an excessive level.45 Eisen sought damages (including treble damages
for the amount of the overcharge), attorneys' fees, and an injunction
against future excessive fees. 6 The action was determined to be a
Rule 23(b)(3) action, 47 and in delineating the notice requirements for
Eisen's class, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the "unmistakable" language of Rule 23(c)(2) to require individual notice to be
sent to all class members whose names and addresses could be ascertained through reasonable effort. 48 Unfortunately for the plaintiff
Eisen, he was able to identify through reasonable effort some two and
a quarter million members of the six-million member class, and the
4
cost of postage alone (estimated by the district court to be $225,000) 0
was prohibitive to the continuation of the suit in which Eisen's individual
damages were only $70.50
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)
(1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an
action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
See Jacoby & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of Federal
Rule 23, 12 SAN Diuoo L. REv. 1, 3 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Jacoby and Cherkasky].
44. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
45. Id. at 160.
46. Id. at 159-61.

47. Id. at 163-64.

48. Id. at 173.
49. Id. at 167.
50. The plaintiff is traditionally required to bear the costs of notice to the class.
However, CAL. Civ. COD §1781(d) allows the trial court to direct either party in a
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The question of whether the Court's basis for requiring notice in
Eisen was merely interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2), or whether it rested
on due process considerations,51 is important not only to future federal
class actions, but also to state class actions since constitutional due
process requirements are binding on the state courts where the Federal
Rules would not be, unless adopted by the state. If it be a due process
decision, legislation to lessen the effect of the decision by amendment
to Rule 23(c) (2) may be unconstitutional.5 2 Further, if notice is
constitutionally required in a Rule 23(b) (3) action, there may be a
possibility that the Supreme Court will find such notice to be required
as well in some Rule 23(b) (1) and 23(b) (2) actions,5" where the
class is loosely bound and thereby resembles the class in a 23(b) (3)
action.
On the state court level, if the Eisen notice requirements are based
on due process considerations, the state courts will have to order notice
to the class in all class actions which are similar to the federal Rule
23(b)(3) type class actions, including consumer class actions seeking
damages. This will diminish, if not destroy, the effectiveness of the
class action device as a remedy in large consumer class actions. If, for
example, the plaintiff is required to bear the cost of individual notice
to class members whose names and addresses are ascertainable through
"reasonable effort" from the defendant's computer mailing lists, the
costs of giving such notice will preclude the continuation of the action,
as in Eisen. Thus, although the consumer with small individual
damages is the one most likely to benefit through a Rule 23(b) (3)
type class action in the state courts, he is also the one to whom the
remedy would most likely be denied by the financially oppressive individual notice requirements of Rule 23 (c) (2) if state courts are constitutionally required to order individual notice in such actions.
Although the Court's interpretation of Rule 23 in Eisen was reinconsumer class action to notify each class member. The constitutionality of this statute
has not yet been judicially determined. See text at notes 124-129 infra.
51. For further discussion of the question of whether individual notice is constitutionally required by Eisen in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, see Jacoby and Cherkasky,
supra note 43, at 10-17; McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and
Realities in Procedure and Substance-ClassAction Issues, 25 HAST. L.J. 1351, 1389-96
(1973-74).
52. Dam, supra note 38, at 110; Jacoby and Cherkasky, supra note 43, at 31.
53. A Rule 23(b) (1) action is one in which the plaintiffs seek relief with respect
to a fund or specific property. A Rule 23(b) (2) action is one in which the remedy
sought is declaratory judgment or injunctive relief rather than money damages. Requiring the plaintiff to give individual notice to the class in, for example, a Rule 23(b) (2)
civil rights or environmental class action would be to destroy the class action device as a
remedy, for all practical purposes, where the plaintiff could obtain, with reasonable
effort, thousands upon thousands of names of potential class members. See Dam, supra
note 38, at 110,
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forced by due process considerations,5 4 the Court further stated that,
due process requirements aside, the express language and intent of
Rule 23(c)(2) require that individual notice be provided. 5 Thus, the
inference from a strict reading of the opinion is that the notice requirement is based on the literal interpretation of Rule 23(c) (2), despite the
due process considerations which were included in the opinion and
developed in the earlier United States Supreme Court case of Mullane
v. CentralHanoverBank & Trust Co."6
1.

Mullane: Notice andDue Process

In Eisen, the Court considered the due process requirements which
are necessary to ensure the res judicata effect of a judgment on absentee class members, as set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. 57 Mullane had been appointed special guardian and attorney to represent the interests of all persons in the income of a common
trust fund. 58 In accordance with a New York State statute, the
respondent Bank published notice of the pending accounting of the
fund in a local newspaper.5 9 Mullane made a special appearance in
the state court, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction because
the beneficiaries of the fund, many of whom were not residents of New
York, had not been afforded adequate notice as required by the fourteenth amendment. 60 The state court overruled Mullane's objections
to the statutory notice and entered a final decree, which was affirmed
by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.61
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, stating:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 60
The Court went on to determine that in this action, since the names
and addresses of known beneficiaries were on hand, there was no
reason to use a means less likely to reach them than the mail to inform
54. 417 U.S. at 173-74.
55. Id. at 175. "Mhe express language and intent of Rule 23(c)(2) leave no
doubt that individual notice must be provided to those class members who are identifiable
through reasonable effort."
56. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
57. Id.; 417 U.S. at 173-75.
58. 339 U.S. at 310.
59. Id. at 309-10.
60. Id. at 311.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3,14.
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them of the action.6 3
The draftsmen of Rule 23 and the Eisen Court64 both interpreted
the Mullane requirements of notice without considering the Mullane
Court's treatment of class actions involying unknown or conjectural
beneficiaries. The procedural questions raised by such actions are
much more relevant to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions in which the class
may at best be merely ascertainable, than to the situation actually
before the Mullane Court, which involved 113 ascertained trust fund
holders whose interests were defined and who were ordinarily notified
by mail by the trustees. 5 The Mullane Court specifically stated that
it did not
consider it unreasonable for the state to dispense with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are either conjectural or future or, although they may be discovered upon
investigation, do not in due course of business come to the
knowledge of the common trustee.16
In dealing with such conjectural or unknown class members, the
Mullane Court felt statutory notice (i.e. notice by publication under the
New York State statute regarding accounting of trust funds) was sufficient, because although it was not likely to reach such members, it was
not likely to be any less efficient than other alternatives.6 7 The
Mullane Court extended this to beneficiaries who could be discovered
upon investigation but who would ordinarily not be known to the trustee
who was required to give notice in that action.6"

The Mullane Court expressly recognized the practical difficulties and
expense involved in attempting to determine the status of large numbers of class members whose interests may be so remote as to be

"ephemeral."6 9 Such expense, if required by due process, would
"impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its
advantages. 70 Requiring such expense is not in keeping with the
Court's test of balancing the state's interest in providing a remedy to
its citizens against the individual interest to be protected by due
process. 71 Rather, the implication of this balancing test is that in cases
in which individual damages are de minimis, the state's interest in pro63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 318.
417 U.S. at 173-75; 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
339 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 313-14.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7

viding a remedy and in ensuring a binding judgment through the class
action device could outweigh the interest in individual notice to each
member of the class, where such members are "missing or unknown"'72
or where the expense of individually notifying each member would preclude bringing the action at all. Therefore, in light of the balancing
of interests approach utilized in Mullane7' and the Court's careful consideration of the practicalities of notice,7 4 it is difficult to see how the
draftsmen of Rule 23 could have interpreted Mullane as requiring
individual notice in a class action in which the number of potential class
members could create the "practical difficulties and costs" which the
Mullane Court recognized were "not required in the name of due
process."7 5
The Mullane Court also expressly considered the res judicata issue
which so concerned the draftsmen of Rule 23, and decided that a final
decree foreclosing the rights of persons "missing or unknown" is not
constitutionally barred by use of "an indirect and even a probably futile
means of notification. '76 It is difficult to see how such express language so fitting to the circumstances of a Rule 23(b)(3) type class
action such as Eisen would have been overlooked by the Eisen Court
if that Court were in fact addressing the due process requirements of
notice.
2.

Hansberry: Adequate RepresentationandDue Process

There is further reason to believe the Eisen Court was not predicating the notice requirements on due process considerations in that the
Court did not consider the decision in Hansberry v. Lee,71 which dealt
with the due process requirement of adequate representation. Petitioner Hansberry had been sued in the Illinois state court for breach
of a racially restrictive covenant. 78 Hansberry claimed as a defense
that the covenant was invalid and unenforceable because a condition
precedent to enforcement, signature of the covenant by 95% of the
72. Id. at 317.
73. Id. at 314.
74. Id. at 317-18.
We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries, many of
whose interests. . . are so remote as to be ephemeral; and we have no doubt
that such impracticable and extended searches are not required in the name of
due process.
75. Id.; Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action
Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PENN. L. Rnv,
889, 914 (1967-68).
76. 339 U.S. at 317.
77. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
78. Id. at 37-38.
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homeowners, had not been performed. 7 9 The Illinois Supreme Court
found, however, that Hansberry was collaterally estopped from asserting this defense because -performance of the condition precedent had
been stipulated in a prior suit.80 This former suit was held to be representative in character, and thus was res judicata in the later action
against Hansberry, although he had not been a party to the prior suit.81
Hansberry then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, contending that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to him deprived
him of due process of law because he was not a party in the prior action,
nor was it a class or representative suit which would allow a binding
82
effect on members of the class who were not parties to the action.
The Supreme Court stated that persons need not be before the court
in a class action or representative action in order to be bound by the
judgment where there is adequate representation of absentees' rights and
interests by parties who are present.8 3 The Court defined the judgment in a class or representative suit as a "recognized exception"8 4 to
the general rule that a judgment in personam is not binding on one
who is not a party in the litigation. 5 This "recognized exception" was
found to comport with the requirements of due process when absent
class members are in fact adequately represented by parties who are
present, or when the interest of ithe absent members is joint with the
interest of the parties before the court. 8 Thus, if the interests of the
representative party are not necessarily or even probably the same as
those of the absent members, the due process requirement of adequate
representation is absent. s7 In Hansberry, the interests of the landowners affected by the covenant were not sufficiently "joint" for the
action to be a class or representative action, since those who attempted
to enforce the covenant "could not be said to be in the same class with
or represent those whose interest was in resisting performance."'8
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39-40.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 41.

85. Id. at 40.

86. Id. at 42-43.
87. Id. at 45.
The restrictive agreement did not purport fo create a joint obligation or liability. If valid and effective its promises were the several obligations of the signers and those claiming under them....
[A]ll those alleged to be bound by
the agreement would not constitute a single class in any litigation brought to
enforce it. Those who sought to secure its benefits by enforcing it could not
be said to be in the same class with or represent those whose interest was in
resisting performance....
88. Id. at 44.
[Mlembers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by
the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are
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Without the requisite joint interest, a party who is present in the first
action is not entitled to bind absent parties by the judgment. Thus,
the Court found that the important consideration in determining
whether due process requirements had been fulfilled, in order for the
judgment in the action to be binding on absent members, was whether
the class members before the court adequately represented the interests of absent members."9
Returning to the question of whether the Court in Eisen was considering due process requirements or was merely interpreting Rule 23, it
may be observed that the Hansberry Court's recognition of the relationship between due process and adequate representation is conspicuously
absent from Eisen. If in fact the question under consideration in Eisen
were the protection of the interests of absentee members through due
process, the statements of the Hansberry Court that identity of interests
and adequacy of the representation by the class representatives were
essential to due process9" would probably have been far more apparent
in the Eisen decision. That the Hansberry decision contained no reference to notice leads to the inference that the Court might, on a consideration of due process requirements alone, sanction a rule which did
not include any notice requirement so long as the interests of the absentees were found to be adequately represented. 91 Instead of considering the petitioner's contention that adequate representation is the
touchstone of due process, 92 the Eisen Court swept by adequate representation and concentrated on the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2).
Had the Court been concerned with the fundamentals of due process
rather than mere interpretation of Rule 23(cX2), it surely would have
considered the fact that Eisen, with his tiny $70 claim, was attempting
to adequately represent a huge class in a suit dealing with complex antitrust and securities issues. The Court noted, and apparently accepted
present, or where they actually participate in the conduct of the litigation in
which members of the class are present as parties, [citations omitted], or
where the interest of the members of the class, some of whom are present as
parties, is joint, or where for any other reason the relationship between the
parties present and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle the former
to stand in judgment for the latter. [citations omitted]
In all such cases, so far as it can be said that the members of the class who
are present are, by generally recognized rules of law, entitled to stand in judgment for those who are not, we may assume for present purposes that such
procedure affords a protection to the parties who are represented, though absent, which would satisfy the requirements of due process....
89. Id. at 4243.

90. Id.

91. Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PENrN. L REv. 889, 911
(1967-68).
92. 417 U.S. at 176-77.
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without discussion, the district court's finding 3 that Eisen, as the representative plaintiff, satisfied the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement of adequate representation. 4 The finding of adequate representation in
Eisen avoided a basic problem attending the class action suit in
Mullane, in which adequate representation was absent because repre-

sentation of the interests of the class of beneficiaries was by a courtappointed attorney,9 5 not by a representative member of the class as
in Eisen. Thus, notice in Mullane was required to protect the rights

of absentee class members by ensuring adequate representation.
If the Court in Eisen had been concerned with due process rather
than Rule 23 requirements,

96

after finding adequate representation to

be present it arguably would have gone on to analyze the interests of
the absent class members as being sufficiently conjectural, in view of
the potentially small individual interests of such members, to allow the
notice by publication which the Mullane Court recognized as adequate

for such interests. 7 But rather than accepting the Mullane Court's
statement that "[a] construction of the Due Process Clause which
would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not
be justified 9 8 as guidance, the Eisen Court based its holding on "the
express language and intent of Rule 23(c)(2)," 99 thereby showing that

the Court's interpretation of notice requirements in Eisen was apparently based on interpretation of Rule 23 procedures, rather than on due

process requirements.
Regardless of whether the individual notice requirement of a Rule
23(b)(3) class action as propounded in Eisen is based on interpretation of the language of Rule 23(c)(2) or is based on constitutional due
93. 52 F.R.D. 253, 260-61 (1971).
94. 417 U.S. at 165.
95. 339 U.S. at 313; see also Dam, supra note 38, at 113.
96. Class action suits brought under Federal Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) may
proceed to a judgment which will be binding on the class without notice of any sort to
the class, as long as the requirements of Rule 23 (a) are fulfilled.
The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Swormsted, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303
(1853), recognized in dicta that the judgment in a class action could be extended to bind
absent class members where adequate representation is present, for convenience and "to
prevent a failure of justice." The only requirement of due process in the early class
action cases in equity was that the representation be adequate. The requirement of a
common interest or right, which the representative parties were to establish or enforce,
was considered by the Court to be a safeguard of adequate representation.
Rule 23 (b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions recognize these early equity principles. The
judgment in a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class action can be extended to the entire class
without notice. The rights and interests of the absentee class members are assured due
process protection by adequate representation alone, even where the class members have
no pre-existing relationship and no common tie except for the requirement of a question
of law or fact common to the class.
97. See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra; Jacoby and Cherkasky, supra note
43, at 14-15 & n.76.
98. 339 U.S. at 313-14.
99. 417 U.S. at 175.
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process requirements, the federal class action which comes under Rule
23(b)(3) is bound by this requirement. California courts, however,
need not consider themselves bound by the federal notice requirement
in the absence of a clear constitutional ruling.100
THE CLASS ACTION IN CALIFORNIA

Even if the United States Supreme Court in Eisen were interpreting
the requirements for Federal Rule 23(c)(2) and not dictating constitutional requirements for notice, California trial courts in class action suits
must nevertheless ensure that the due process requirements delineated
by the Supreme Court in Mullane and Hansberry are satisfied before
the resulting judgment may be extended to bind the entire class, including absent members. Only under such circumstances will the action
fulfill one of the principal purposes of the class action device-reducing a multiplicity of litigation arising from the same act.
When dealing with the typical consumer class action in which the
class may extend to many members with individual damages which are
de minimus, the danger of an inflexible requirement of individual
notice to all class members who may be discovered through reasonable
effort is immediately apparent, since the financial burden of such notice
may make the maintenance of such an action economically impossible.
If such a requirement were imposed, the manifold benefits of such an
action would remain unavailable to the court, the injured parties, and
the public. 1 1 However, the basic function of the class action device,
which is to allow some parties to litigate the rights of all similarly situated, 10 2 requires that the rights and interests of the absent parties be
somehow protected through due process concepts if the judgment is to
be fairly extended to include the absent parties. Thus, the problem
of whether both adequate representation and notice to the class are
required to ensure the Protection of due process, or whether adequate
representation is sufficient alone or with a form of notice less than
individual notice, is of great importance to the future of consumer class
actions in California.
Before a class action suit may be maintained in California, it must
meet the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure Section 382, which
100. Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d, 960, 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381
(1975). ". . . if the United States Supreme Court had desired to hold that such notice
was constitutionally required, it certainly could have phrased its holdings [in Eisen] in
less Delphic language."
101. See text accompanying notes 3-8 supra.

102. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 3A 42-43 (1940); see text accompanying notes
108-110 infra.
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provides the basic statutory authorization for class actions in California.
This statute reads in part:
[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue
03
or defend for the benefit of all.1
Judicial interpretation of this statute has determined two requirements
10 4
-an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest.
Although these two requirements were historically interpreted in a very
restrictive sense, this approach has been gradually eased. Currently,
the class members no longer have to be necessary parties, 10 5 and there
need no longer be a common fund.10 6
Section 382 has been interpreted by the California Supreme Court
in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.'° 7 to require an ascertainable class and a
"well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact
involved affecting the parties to be represented."'10 The court stated
that Section 382 was based upon the equitable doctrine of virtual representation, which allows maintenance of a suit by some parties on behalf
of themselves and others, where the interested parties are numerous
and the suit is for an objective common to all parties, whether present
or not. 0 9 The doctrine of virtual representation, in turn, is based upon
necessity and convenience, and was adopted by Section 382 "to prevent
a failure of justice.""10
When the class action has been found to satisfy the requirements of
Section 382, the trial court must determine what procedural steps are
required in the action, since Section 382 itself contains no procedural
guidelines. The trial court has two procedural schemes from which it
can fashion a procedure to satisfy due process requirements for absent
class members: the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
2
Procedure,"' and Section 1781 of the California Civil Code."
103. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §382.
104. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704, 433 P.2d 732, 739, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724, 731 (1967); Lobell, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1041, 1042-43 (1970-71).
105. Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514
(1948).
106. Chance v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1962).
107. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724.
108. Id. at 704, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
109. Id. at 703-04, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
110. Id. at 703-04, 433 P.2d at 738-39, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
111. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 809 (1971).
112. Id. at 818, 484 P.2d at 975, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 807. The procedure outlined in
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act has been held to be mandatory where applicable:
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ProceduralProvisionsof FederalRule 23

If the trial court has adopted the federal rule as a guide,1 3 individual
notice to each member of the class who can be identified through
reasonable effort is required by Rule 23(c)(2) for a Rule 23(b)(3)
type class action. 14 The moment this decision is made, however, the
danger arises that the class action will fail if the plaintiff is required
to furnish individual notice to all class members identifiable through
reasonable effort, since the financial burden of such notice will very
probably be beyond the plaintiff's resources.
However, if the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen is not based on
due process requirements," 5 California courts are not bound by the
individual notice requirement propounded by that Court, 1 6 but can
consider the notice plan proposed for Rule 23(b)(3) actions by the
District Court in Eisen III," and can set up a similar notification
scheme which will ease the financial burden of notice on the plaintiff
and still comply with Mullane due process requirements."18
Another method which the court can use is to divide the class into
subclasses, 1 9 and proceed to trial with the subclass rather than with
the entire class. Individual notice to each member of the subclass
would not be as onerous as notice to the entire class. The subclass
method of notice may be used by the court when (1) the class is of
such great size that the maintenance of the action as a class action creates
manageability problems insofar as individual notice to the entire class
is financially impossible, 20 and (2) the court is assured that the
"class actions by consumers brought under section 1770 of the act . . . must be
brought under the provisions of the act." Id.
113. This comment will focus on consumer class actions in which the recovery
sought is money damages. This type of action resembles most closely the federal Rule
23(b)(3) type class action, in which the class members are loosely connected by
common questions of law or fact, with no pre-existing relationship between them, and in
which money damages is the primary remedy sought. The federal rules, as interpreted
by Eisen, mandate individual notice to all class members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. 417 U.s. 156 (1974); see text accompanying notes 47-48
supra. Therefore, California trial courts using Rule 23 as a model would be bound to
require individual notice by Rule 23(c) (2).
114. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 117
Cal. Rptr. 485, 488 (1974).
115. See generally text accompanying notes 45-100 supra.
116. Even a strict adherence to the Supreme Court's requirements in Eisen of
individual notice to all class members identifiable through reasonable effort does not
prohibit such procedures as enclosing notice in the same envelope as the defendant uses
for billing, with the plaintiff bearing the costs of printing and stuffing such notice. See
417 U.S. at 180 n.1 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
117. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 267-68 (1971).
118. 339 U.S. at 317. -This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to
publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably
possible or practicable to give more adequate warning."
119. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 23(c) (4) (B).
120. 417 U.S. at 179-85 (Dougas, J., dissenting).
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representative plaintiff will continue to adequately represent the subclass.' 2 ' If the entire class is defined in the original complaint, there is
no statute of limitations problem for the later subclasses, since the filing of the original complaint would toll the statute,' 2 2 and the defendant would be informed of the full extent of his potential liability. 123
Another alternative to requiring the plaintiff to bear the full burden

of the expense of notice is to impose part of the cost on the defenddant.124

The District Court in Eisen III, after a hearing at which it

determined that the plaintiff would probably prevail at trial, allotted
90% of the cost of notice to the defendant. 125 Although the Supreme
Court later held that "nothing in either the language or the history of
Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may

be maintained as a class action,' 26 California courts do have statutory
authority for such procedure. 2 7 California case law also shows
acceptance of such a procedure, as demonstrated by Cartt v. Superior
Court,12 in which the court considered the use of a mini-hearing to

determine the probable outcome of the suit as a means of ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of notice under Civil Code Section 1781(d)

without running a substantial risk of a due process challenge.

29

Even if the court proceeds under the Rule 23 procedure and

requires notice in Rule 23(b)(3) type actions, it is not, absent a constitutional mandate, frozen into any particular form of notice. 30 This
concept was reflected by the California Supreme Court in City of San
Jose v. Superior Court,'3 ' where the court observed that "[n]otice
is mandatory under the federal rules . . . and should be ordered as soon
121. FaD. R. Civ. PROC. 23(a)(4).
122. American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
123. If there is a final judgment on the merits of the action of the first subclass, this
judgment may be asserted against the defendant by later subclasses if the issues presented
by the later subclasses are identical to those determined in the first action. See text
accompanying note 190 infra.
124. See CAL. Cr. RULEs, Manual for Conduct of Pretrial Proceedings in Class
Actions, §427.6(c)(iii), at 20 (1974). This section allows the court to consider which
party should bear the cost of notice, or whether and in what manner the cost should be
divided between the parties.
125. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1972).
126. 417 U.S. at 177.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE §1781(c)(3).
128. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
129. Id. at 974-75, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
130. See CAL. Cr. RULEs, Manual for Conduct of Pretrial Proceedings in Class
Actions, §427.6(c) (ii), at 20 (1974). This section allows the court, at the hearing of
the issue of notice, to consider the manner in which notice, if ordered, should be given.
The party who submits a motion for an order concerning the giving of or dispensing with
notice must submit a statement of the proposed methods of notifying the class, an
estimate of the cost of each such method, and the percentage of class members likely to
receive knowledge of the action through each method.
131. 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974).
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as possible after the court determines the class action appropriate."'
However, the court added that the form of the notice could be determined in later proceedings before the trial court.'" 3
Therefore, if the trial court looks to Rule 23 for procedural guidance,
some form of notice to class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) type action
is required, although the court may adopt a method whereby the heavy
financial burden of individual notice may be mitigated. However, California trial courts have another procedural scheme available which affords much more flexibility.

ProceduralProvisionsof CaliforniaCivil Code Section 1781

B.

In 1970, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act was adopted to provide
remedies for any consumer who suffers injury as a result of a deceptive
practice declared by the Act to be unlawful. 34 The consumer may
obtain actual damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages, or such
other or inclusive relief as the court may deem proper.'3" Section
178 1(a) allows recovery to be sought through a class action:
Any consumer entitled to bring an action under Section 1780 may,
if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage to other
consumers similarly situated, bring an action to recover damages
or obtain other relief as provided for in Section 1780.
The requirements for maintenance of a class action under this
section are set forth in Section 1781(b), which provides that the action
may be maintained as a consumer class action if all the following conditions exist:
(1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before
the court.
(2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting
the individual members.
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
(4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
These requirements for maintenance of a consumer class action are
132. Id. at 454, 525 P.2d at 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
133. Id.
134. CAL. Civ. CoDE §1750 et seq.; see also Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
800, 820, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809 (1971), which authorizes the trial
court to consider the procedures in the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§1781, even in an action to which the Act is not directly applicable.
135. CAL. CIv. CODE §1780.
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almost identical to the requirements of Rule 23(a) for the maintenance
of a class action in federal courts, indicating that the California Legislature may have intended that Rule 23136 be used as a guide for construing the application of Section 1781. However, even though the
legislature apparently considered Rule 23, the provisions of Section
1781 regarding notice and the binding effect of the judgment in an
action do not include the definite requirements of individual notice
included in Rule 23(c)(2) for Rule 23(b)(3) type actions. Instead,
Section 178 1(d) provides:
If the action is permitted as a class action, the court may direct
either party to notify each member of the class of the action. The
party required to serve notice may, with the consent of the court,
if personal notification is unreasonably expensive or it appears
that all members of the class cannot be notified personally, give
notice as prescribed herein by publication in accordance with Section 6064 of the Government Code in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county in which the transaction occurred.
Thus, in using the procedure outlined in the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, the court has discretion to determine whether notice is
to be given; 3 7 in what form the notice, if required, is to be given; 3 s
if published notice is necessary;""9 and which party is to bear the
40
burden of the notice costs.'
Even though the United States Supreme Court had not, at the time
this statute was enacted, delineated the requirements for notice in
Rule 23(b)(3) actions, the mandate of Rule 23(c)(2) directing the
court to order individual notice to all members of the class who can
be identified through reasonable effort was not adopted by the legislature, although the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) as to what the
notice, if given, must include, were adopted almost verbatim in Section
1781(e)." 4' The legislature's purposes, "to protect consumers against
136. FED. R. CIrv. Pxoc. 23(a).
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

137.

CAL.CIrv. CODE

§1781(d).

138. CAL. Civ. CODE §1781(d).
139. CAL. Civ. CODE §1781(c)(2).
140. CAL. Civ. CoDE §1781(d).
141. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 23(c)(2) reads inpart:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B3)the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
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unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and
economical procedures to secure such protection,"1 42 were recognized

143
by the California Supreme Court in Vasquez v. Superior Court.
These purposes are furthered by allowing discretionary notice and, if

notice is found to be required, allowing the court to place the burden
144

of notice on either party.
However, nothing in the Consumers Legal Remedies Act itself
dictates when the court should direct notice and, if ordered, when

individual notice would be so "unreasonably expensive" as to allow the
ordered notice to be by publication. 45 Further, there are no judicially

determined guidelines, since the courts have not yet expressly dealt
with the issue of when notice to the class may be entirely dispensed

with prior to judgment except in cases involving unusual circumstances.' 40
C.

Code of Civil ProcedureSection 382: Is Notice Required?

In delineating the procedural requirements for class action suits,
Section 382 may be considered indicative of the importance of notice
and its relationship to the requirement of adequate representation in
ensuring due process protection of the interests of absent class members. Nothing in the language of Section 382 refers to notice or any
requirements for notice. However, there is the requirement that the
question be one of "common or general interest," which would entitle
the members of the class who are present to stand in judgment for absent

members, since protection is afforded to the absent members by adequate representation. 4 7 The California Supreme Court's statement in
reads:
The notice required by subdivision (d) shall include the following:
(1) The court will exclude the member notified from the class if he so requests
by a specified date.
(2) The judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion.
(3) Any member who does not request exclution may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through counsel.
142. CAL. CIV. CODE §1760 (emphasis added).
143. 4 Cal. 3d at 807-08, 484 P.2d at 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
144. CAL. Crv. CODE §1781(d). The constitutional difficulties inherent in a proceeding which allows the court to require the defendant to bear the cost of notice prior to
a determination of the merits of the suit have already been recognized by the courts. See
Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 974-75, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 386 (1975).
145. CAL. CMv. CODE §1781(d).
146. See Colwell Co. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 32, 123 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1975). The court held that where the defendant, for nonfrivolous reasons, stipulates to
trial of the issue of liability prior to determination of the class action issues, no legal
detriment accrues to the class by permitting trial of the issue of liability before the class
is notified.
147. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
[W]hen the only circumstance defining the class is that the determination of
the rights of its members turns upon a single issue of fact or law, a state [may]
CAL. Cv. CODE §1781(e)
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Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. 143 that Section 382 is based on the doctrine of

virtual representation 149 implies that the court thought that adequate
representation, not notice, was of primary importance in determining
if the judgment in the action would be res judicata -as to absentees as
well as parties. This implication is strengthened by the court's exhaustive discussion of the requirement of a common interest, not only in
Daarbut also in earlier cases in which class action status had been denied
because there was not a sufficient community of interest present.150 The
court's emphasis on this requirement is again very similar to the Hansberry Court's insistence on adequate representation through parties
whose interests are joint. 5 . Otherwise, "a selection of representatives
.* .whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably
the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford
15 2
that protection to absent parties which due process requires.'
A further indication that the court in Daar was concerned more with
adequate representation through identity of interests than with notice
as the essential element to ensure that a judgment binding as to absentees would comport with due process is the fact that this court, like the
Hansberry Court, did not even mention notice. Instead, the court
stated that "[i]f the existence of an ascertainable class has been shown,
there is no need to identify its individual members in order to bind all
members by the judgment." 53 If the individual members are not identified prior to a binding judgment, individual notice to such members
prior to identification is of course impossible. Nevertheless, the court
did not seem concerned with the lack of notice to such persons prior
to the judgment, but rather stated that the judgment in the action would
be res judicata as to all persons to whom the common questions of
law and fact pertained. 54 Additionally, in dealing with the possibility
of a collateral attack on the judgment by an absentee, the court stated
that in such a case "a more careful scrutiny of" the action's "representative character may be made in determining whether it is res judicata."'' 55
Thus, in the court's consideration of the entire course of the action,
from establishing the class through determining who is bound by the
constitutionally adopt a procedure whereby some of the members of the class
could stand in judgment for all, provided that the procedure were so devised
and applied as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue.
148. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
149. See text accompanying notes 108-110 supra.
150. 67 Cal. 2d at 710-11, 433 P.2d at 743-44, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 735-36.
151. 311 U.S. at 43.
152. Id. at 45.
153. 67 Cal. 2d at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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judgment, to and including the possibility of a collateral attack on such
judgment by an absentee, adequate representation through an identity
of interests is apparently the major due process consideration, rather
than notice to absentee class members.
In Chance v. Superior Court,156 an earlier class action brought under
Section 382, the court considered the issue of adequacy of representation. The named plaintiffs' representation of the action was challenged
by class members who had filed the same action in the federal district
court and wished to proceed there.' 57 The California Supreme Court
stated that although due process of law may not be fulfilled where
individual plaintiffs obtain a judgment on behalf of a class which
includes persons whose interests are directly opposite to those of the
representative plaintiff, a mere difference of opinion between class
members as to the remedy to be sought is not sufficient to destroy the
requisite community of interest.' 58 The court went on to state that "the
essentials of due process of law in class suits would appear to be
afforded by fair representation in the assertion of claims of class members against the opposing parties in any lawsuit, and notice of the pending suit."' 59 The notice requirement here, in light of the facts of this
case, is arguably related to adequate representation. The court, in its
consideration of whether notice was given by a reliable method, stated
that notice would give the absent class members an opportunity to
decide whether to appear and argue for any and all appropriate or available remedies which they individually desired.1 60 This would ensure
adequate representation in a class action in which class members may
wish to pursue different remedies, although the action itself includes
the requisite community of interest to allow adjudication of the liability
issues as a class action under Section 382. Thus, despite the consideration of notice in the Chance case, the court apparently did not mean
to imply that Section 382 itself required notice to fulfill the due process
requirements of a class action, but rather that notice would ensure adequate representation in a case where class members wished to pursue
different remedies.
The inference from the interpretation of the requirements of Section
382 in Daar and Chance is that the California courts consider adequate
representation, rather than notice, to be the important means of ensuring that due process is afforded to absent members of the class so that
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1962).
Id. at 278, 282-83, 373 P.2d at 850, 853, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 762, 765.
Id. at 289, 373 P.2d at 858, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
Id. at 290, 373 P.2d at 858, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
Id.
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the judgment may be constitutionally binding as to absentees. This
conclusion remains even though the class action in Daar would have
been a Rule 23(b)(3) type action under the federal rules,""' which
would require individual notice to all class members ascertainable
1 62
through reasonable effort had it been brought in the federal courts.'

The Daar court did not have the Eisen decision to guide it in its
consideration of procedural requirements, but it did consider the
requirements of Rule 23, and found the requirements of bringing an
action under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) to be substantially the same
as those for bringing an action under Section 382 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. 6 The court, however, did not take the additional step of
considering the express notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) for such
actions, a step it could have taken to ensure, according to the draftsmen of Rule 23, that due process requirements would be fulfilled, 0 4
allowing the judgment to be binding on the entire class. It would be
difficult to understand why the court did not consider this issue if in
fact it thought adequate representation was insufficient to ensure such
an effect.
The focus of the California courts on the requirement of adequate
representation rather than notice 65 as ensuring that due process is
afforded to absent members so that the judgment may be binding on
them raises the further question of whether adequate representation is
assured without notice to the class. If the absent class members would
have additional claims against the defendant which would be waived
by a binding judgment in the class action including such members, or
when the amounts are sufficiently large that individual members would
obtain a substantial benefit from the opportunity to determine whether
161. The Daar court stated that Rule 23 criteria for the maintenance of a class
action suit were substantially similar to the court's view of the applicable criteria of
Section 382. 67 Cal. 2d at 709, 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734. The court then
found that under Section 382 there must be "substantial benefits" from the class action to
both the court and the litigants, and that the common questions must be "sufficiently
important" to permit a class action rather than multiple suits. Id. at 713, 433 P.2d at
745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 737. This requirement is very similar to the Rule 23(b) (3)
requirement that the common questions of law or fact predominate over questions
affecting only individual class members, and that the class action be superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. FE. R. Civ.
PRoc. 23(b) (3).
162. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974).
163. 67 Cal. 2d at 709, 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734; see also Comment,
Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1041, 1059-61 (1970-71).
164. See 39 F.R.D. 69, 107.
165. That notice is not considered indispensible to a California class action is shown
by CAL. CT. RULEs, Manual for Conduct of Pretrial Proceedings in Class Actions,
§427.6, at 19 (1974). "Although as a general rule notice to the class of the pendency of
the action shall be ordered, notice to the class is not necessary in all actions, and an
order may be made, on motion of a party, dispensing with the requirement that the class
be notified of the action." Id.
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to appear and argue for additional remedies,1 66 representation without notice sufficient to ensure that such members are apprised of
the action may not be adequate, 16 7 even if there is a sufficient
community of interests to allow the action to proceed as a class action.
However, if the court finds the interests of the representative plaintiff
and the absent members to be identical, adequacy of representation
may be ensured even without notice to the class. The courts have not
delineated any test for determining whether or not the class is adequately represented; rather, a finding that adequate representation is
present in a particular case depends upon the circumstances of that
case. 168 Thus, if the circumstances in a particular case indicate that
there is adequate representation, there is no need to notify the class
in order to protect this requirement of due process.' 6 9
Although the primary due process consideration in a consumer class
action in which the individual damages are small would appear to be
adequate representation, California trial courts may still feel that in
order to constitutionally extend the judgment to absentee class members, those members must have the additional protection of notice to
apprise them of their interests and to afford them an opportunity to be
heard. However, a preoccupation with ensuring that the judgment is
binding on absent class members may result in the "failure of justice"
which the class action device under California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 382 was designed to prevent.'
Is RES JUDICiTA NECEssARY?
If the principal reason for requiring notice to all members of the class
in a consumer class action is that such notice makes a binding judgment possible on all class members and the defendant,1" 1 the trial court
should consider whether adequate representation alone, absent statutory or constitutional requirements to the contrary, is enough without
notice to ensure that due process requirements are satisfied so that
the judgment may be extended to absentees as well as to parties before
the court. The crucial question underlying the whole due process
166. See 58 Cal. 2d at 290, 373 P.2d at 858, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 770; Cooper v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 283-85, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579, 584-85
(1976).
167. 58 Cal. 2d at 290, 373 P.2d at 858, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
168. 67 Cal. 2d at 710, 433 P.2d at 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
169. This may have been the purpose of the California Legislature in allowing
discretionary notice in CAL. CIV. CODE §1781(d), while at the same time requiring that
the representative plaintiff adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class, in
§1781(b) (4).
170. 67 Cal. 2d at 703-04, 433 P.2d at 738-39, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
171. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011, 117
Cal. Rptr. 485, 488 (1974).
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problem is, however, whether the trial court must require the assurance
that the judgment will be res judicata to the entire class as a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action as a class action.
In dealing with this question, the California courts have come to
conflicting results. In Home Savings v. Superior Court17 2 the Second
Division of the Second District Court of Appeal stated that aside from
the recognized use of notice as a method of protecting the class by
ensuring adequate representation, the defendant in a class action suit
is entitled to a judgment that will be meaningful. 1 73 Otherwise, the
defendant in an action in which the entire plaintiff class was not given
notice would be subject to further suits by class members who were
neither parties nor notified by parties in the first suit. 74 The circumstances of the Home Savings case could be distinguished, however,
from circumstances likely to be present in a typical consumer class
action. In Home Savings, there were seven other comparable class
action suits seeking damages for allegedly illegal late charges already
pending against the defendant. Further, the individual damages
75
sought by the named plaintiffs alone were $530.88, plus interest.'
Where individual damages are more than de minimis, the individual
class members are more likely to litigate in order to recover such damages, and the threat of multiplicity of litigation is a possibility which
should be considered by the trial court in determining whether or not assurance of a res judicata effect of judgment is a necessary pre-requisite
76
to maintenance of the class suit.'
In a typical consumer class action, however, where individual
damages are de minimis, and the goals of deterring illegal practices by
the defendant and securing redress to the class as a whole would be
best served by a class action suit, the later argument of the Fifth
Division of the Second District Court of Appeal in Cartt v. Superior
Court'77 is much more persuasive. 1 78 In Cartt, the court maintained
that a defendant who has victimized hundreds of thousands of class
members has no constitutional right to be subjected to only one lawsuit,' 79 and further, that the court is not required to assure such defend172. 42 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1974).
173. Id. at 1012, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
174. Id. at 1014, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
175. Id. at 1008-09, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
176. Cooper v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 284-85, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 579, 585 (1976).
177. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
178. The Fifth Division of the Second District Court of Appeal has recently
reiterated this argument. See Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d
274, 284-85, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579, 585 (1976).
179. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82.
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ant that the class action will not proceed unless the defendant can be
reassured in advance that, if he is successful, all class members will be
foreclosed by the judgment. 80 Rather, the interest being protected by
the res judicata effect of the judgment is the integrity and purposes of
the class action device itself, as an instrument for redress of small
individual damages, as a method of deterrence and punishment for
fraudulent practices inflicted on consumers, and as a method of ensuring
for practical purposes that the court will not be inundated with a multiplicity of suits arising from the same transaction."8
The court in Cant weighed the economic realities of requiring
individual notice against the benefits of allowing the class action suit
to proceed, and recognized that case law in California has indicated that
such class actions should be permitted "where the economic realities
involved in giving 'adequate' notice, compared to the small individual
82
losses of class members, would effectively negate any class action."'
The court suggested that in such a case a distinction could be made
between the maintenance of the suit and the binding effect of its judgment on absent parties. 83 If the judgment resulting from the class
action is later attacked by an absent party, at that time "a more careful
scrutiny of its representative character may be made in determining
whether it is res judicata."' s4
The court's rationale in this case assumed, arguendo, that the definition of notice requirements in Eisen was based on constitutional
requirements of ensuring that the judgment be binding on all class
members.'8 5 The court went further, however, and drew a distinction
between settling the action for all practical purposes and settling it for
theoretical purposes.' 88 In the typical consumer class action, in which
the individual damages of each class member are de minimis, 8 7 the

remote theoretical possibility that a class member with such de minimis
damages will bring another suit if not bound by individual notice in the
class action'8 8 is far outweighed by the benefits to be obtained through
the use of the class action device in such situations.'89
180. Id. at 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 971, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
186. Id. at 968, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82.
187. See id. at 973, 124 Cal. Rptr at 385.
188. Id. at 969, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 382; Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n,
55 Cal. App. 3d at 284-85, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
189. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971); see also text accompanying note 5 supra.
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Thus, in a class action suit in which the plaintiff class is successful,
class members who did not receive individual notice and who bring a

later action, claiming they were not bound by the original judgment,
may assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel on the issue of liability

against the defendant, 190 who in the original complaint would have been
apprised of the extent of his potential liability by the definition of the
entire class. Further, class members bringing a later suit would have

the benefit of the practical effect of stare decisis to the extent that the
facts in the later case are substantially the same as those in the former

case and the same issue is in controversy.'

If the defendant were

successful against the class, the possibility that he would be subjected

to further suits by class members claiming they were not bound by the
original judgment is extremely small.' 92 Therefore, in a case in which
individual damages are slight,'9 3 the trial court, in determining whether

the action should proceed if individual notice is economically impossible, need not focus on "what, as a practical matter, may be the least
important of the factors which will discourage future litigation: the res
judicata effect of the pending action on particular class members surfacing after this case is history.'

94

On the other hand, if the damages

per individual member are large:
class members . .. [are] much less likely to abandon their claims,
and, absent personal notice to assure that the matter would be
res judicata to the remaining class members, any advantages in
the class action mechanism would be negatived by the likelihood
that the issue would surface again.' 95
In a class action in which the class members' individual damages are
190. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813,
122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea was asserted a party or in privity with
a party to the prior adjudication?
191. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 969, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
192. Schuck and Cohen, The Consumer Class Action: An Endangered Species, 12
SAN DIEGo

L. REv. 39, 70 (1975).

An absent class member could, of course, decide to institute a subsequent suit
against the successful class action defendant. This possibility, however, would
be exceedingly remote .... [flor in addition to the financial disincentives to
such a suit, the difficulty in convincing a court that he should not be estopped
by the prior judgment, . . .the plaintiff in the subsequent action would confront the most formidable obstacle of all-the stare decisis effect of the prior
judgment.
193. California courts allow aggregation of claims in order to meet the jurisdictional
requirements of superior court, while federal courts do not allow aggregation. See
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291, 299 (1973) (federal decisions not permitting aggregation).
194. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 970, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
195. Id. at 972, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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insufficient to threaten further litigation if the entire class is not bound
by individual notice, the practical effect of the judgment may have been
a factor which the legislature intended the courts to consider in determining whether personal notification is unreasonably expensive.100 If
the individual damages do not merit the expense of individual litigation,
and the cost of individual notice is so great that it would preclude the

action being brought as a class action, individual notice may be considered unreasonably expensive. 197 Section 1781(g) permits the judgment to bind absentee class members in cases in which individual notice
is not given, and even in cases in which no notice at all is given.

This

section describes the judgment in such an action as including not only
those to whom notice was directed and who have not requested exclu1 8
sion, but also those whom the court finds to be members of the class. 9
If no notice is given to the class, the fluid recovery scheme
implemented in Daar is a method of solving the problem of notification
if the class is huge, ascertainable, but unidentified, and the class mem-

bers are repeating consumers of the defendant. In Daar,the class was
ascertainable but unidentifiable (taxicab users within a certain defined
period of time), and the court stated that "no one may recover his
separate damages until he comes forward, identifies himself and proves

the amount thereof."'

99

In order to return the benefits of the class

196. CAL. Crv. CODE §1781(d) is admittedly ambiguous. In a literal reading of a
statement within that section that "the court may direct either party to notify each
member of the class," the argument could be made that notice is required, and the court's
discretion extends only to determining which party shall be required to give such notice.
However, the "California Supreme Court's positive and encouraging attitude towards
consumer class actions," 50 Cal. App. 3d at 966, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 380, and the stated
intent of the legislature in drafting the Consumers Legal Remedies Act "to provide
affirmative remedies for consumers which will protect them from unscrupulous business
practices. . by providing the consumer with a lawsuit for himself or on behalf of all
other similarly situated consumers," Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's
Analysis of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAc. L.J. 1, 25 (1971), are strong
support for the view that the legislature had no intention of locking class action courts
into the framework of required notice in class action cases in which such notice
requirement would effectively kill the class action as a remedy.
197. Cooper v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 285, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 579, 585 (1976).
198. CAL. CMv. CODE §1781(g).
If notice is not required in any form prior to judgment, a conflict arises within Section
1781 itself. CAL. Crv. CODE §1781(g) requires that "The best possible notice of
judgment shall be given in such manner as the court directs to each member who was
personally served with notice pursuant to subdivision (d) and did not request exclusion"
(emphasis added). What if no class members were served with personal notice, or
notice were dispensed with prior to judgment? To whom is the notice of judgment to be
given in such case; and should such notice be ordered if it will, in effect, consume a
disproportionate amount of the final recovery? The fluid recovery device could be used
to reimburse unidentifiable repeating consumer class members even without notice to
such members of the judgment, after claims of identifiable members who come forward
and prove the amount of their damages are satisfied. The possibility that the costs of
identifying and notifying all class members of the judgment will unreasonably diminish
the amount of the recovery would also be avoided.
199. 67 Cal. 2d at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
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recovery to unidentifiable but repeating users, a fluid recovery scheme
was used.2 0° The parties reached an out-of-court settlement of $1.4
million,
of which $950,000 was to be returned to the class by a reduction
of taxicab fares below the then existing maximum authorized
fares. The defendants agreed to reduce fares in a minimum of
$95,000 annually until the -total fare reduction was completed....
The plaintiff recommended this form of recovery because it was
-feared that the cost of administering and supervising claims would
consume a disproportionate amount of the money recovered in

judgment ....201
202
The fluid recovery device has also been used on the federal level.
Although the Second Circuit has decided that the fluid recovery device
is "illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the manageability problems of
class actions and wholly improper," 20 3 the Supreme Court has not yet
determined this issue.20 4

The fluid recovery device provides a method of recovery for class
members who are repeating consumers of the defendant, thereby fulfilling one of the beneficial purposes of the class action suit even without notice. With such devices available to the trial court, as well as
the requirement that the representation of absent class members' interests by the named class members be adequate, protection of the interests of consumer class members with small individual damages is
assured for all practical purposes. To secure the additional benefits
of a class action suit, including the reduction of multiplicity of litigation
as a danger to the courts and a threat to the defendant, the best protection the class action court can grant is "to give itself reasonable assurance that under all of the circumstances that may prevail in the
future . . . renewed harassment is nothing but a remote theoretical
'20 5
possibility.
200. CAL. Cr. RULES, Manualfor Conduct of PretrialProceedings in Class Actions,

§427.3(e), at 18 (1974), recognizes the fluid recovery device as a possible means of
relief which must be considered at the pretrial hearings on class issues.
201. Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damages Calculation in Consumer
Class Actions, 70 MICH.L. REv. 338, 366 & n.186 (1971). See Grossman, ClassActions:
Manageability and the Fluid Recovery Doctrine, 47 L.A. BAa. BuLL. 415 (September,
1972); see also McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities
in Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HAMST. L.J. 1351 (1974).
202. Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm., 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 913 (1963).
203. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2nd Cir. 1973).
204. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10 (1974). "We, therefore,
have no occasion to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the issues
of manageability and fluid class recovery . .. ."

205. Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 969, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 382
(1975).
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CONCLUSION

Resolution of the tension between the due process requirements
sufficient to ensure the res judicata effect of a class action judgment
and the maintenance of the consumer class action to redress minor
individual injuries caused to large groups of people by the wrongful acts
of the defendant obviously does not lend itself to the procedural straitjacket of legislation. That "[dianger lies in the rigidity of a detailed
rule' 20 6 has been shown by the inflexible notice requirement for Rule
23(b)(3) actions contained in Rule 23(c)(2), and interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Eisen. 0 7 The inflexibility of such a
procedure, although it does indeed ensure that the judgment will be
res judicata to those class members receiving individual notice who do
not request exclusion, has the effect of thwarting the primary purpose
of the class action device as an equitable means to further the legitimate
interests of the court and the parties in reducing the multiplicity of litigation by allowing a forum for the determination of small claims which
do not lend themselves to individual litigation.
On the other hand, the present statutory authority for class actions
in California, while reflecting the flexibility urged by the California
Supreme Court, lacks definitive guidelines for the court to adopt in determining the procedural requirements of a class action suit.20 8 Thus, in
dealing with consumer class actions, the courts must continually maintain a delicate balance between the public interest in reducing multiplicity of litigation, the defendant's interest in binding the entire class
so as to avoid the harassment of further suits, and the plaintiffs' interest
in recovery of their damages and punishment of the defendant by
retrieving from the wrongdoer all his ill-gotten gains.
Perhaps the basic question which must be asked in all such cases
is: "For whose benefit is the notice to be given?" Although the immediate answer is "For the benefit of all parties and the court, by ensuring that the judgment will be binding on the entire class," the problem
reaches deeper than that. Surely notice is not intended to be what it
has become in the federal courts: a weapon the defendant can use
against the class action to effectively destroy it at the moment it is classified as a Rule 23(b)(3) type action. There is, furthermore, something inconsistent in allowing the defendant to assert the rights of
absent class members to receive individual notice. Individual notice
to all class members can only strengthen the representative plaintiffs
206. Moore, supra note 23, at 571.
207. 417 U.S. at 175; see text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
208. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
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case against the defendant, not only by ensuring that the judgment
binds all class members, but also by ensuring that adequate representation of all facets of the issues to be litigated is present. Thus, the
absentees may come forward with further claims against the defendant
which, as long as such questions of law or fact are common to the class,
may be presented by the representative plaintiff. There is also the
possibility of unfavorable publicity for the defendant if individual notice
is ordered, as shown by the recent Second District Court of Appeal case
of Colwell Company v. Superior Court,20 9 in which the defendant stipu-

lated to a trial of the issue of liability prior to notice to the class, for
fear that notice of the impending action would encourage the class
members to withhold payments to the defendant. 10
The only legal benefit accruing to the defendant by requiring
individual notice to all class members is the assurance that the judgment
will be binding on the entire class, assuming that such action can proceed at all in the face of the expense of such notice. However, as the
court stated in Cartt, nothing prevents the defendant from giving notice
at his own expense, and if the defendant is "sincerely troubled about
the res judicata effect of this litigation, it should be permitted to buy
as much protection against future claimants as it thinks it needs. ' ' 1
The interests of the state in providing a forum for its citizens, and
the interest of the plaintiffs in obtaining redress for individually minor
injuries involving complex legal issues, must also be considered in
determining the notice requirements. The Mullane Court's balancing
of the "interests of the State in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries
to a final settlement" against the individual interest to be protected by
due process 212 could be considered here. The protection of the interests of absentee class members is vital to the continuing usefulness of
the class action device. The most obvious method of protecting absentee class members' interests is by requiring individual notice to the class
members as a prerequisite to that suit.21 3 As the United States
Supreme Court has noted, 21 4 "[tihe fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard. ' 21 5 Further, "[tihis right
to be heard has little reality or worth ubless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or
209. 50 Cal. App. 3d 32, 123 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1975).
210. Id. at 34, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29.
211. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 974, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 386.

212. 339 U.S. at 313-14.

213. Comment, Class Actions and Interpleader: California Procedure and the
Federal Rules, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120, 136 (1953-54).
214. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
215. Id. at 394,
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default, acquiesce or contest."21 6 However, if the class member is
deprived of any hearing at all because the class action device is eco-

nomically infeasible due to the requirement of individual notice, and
the claims of the individual member, though possibility meritorious, are
not suited to an expensive individual litigation, surely this is also an

effective deprivation of "the opportunity to be heard. 217
To avoid depriving the consumer class of any hearing at all by
imposing a financially impossible burden of individual notice upon the
representative plaintiff, the trial court should consider the possibility
that adequate representation, rather than individual notice, is sufficient
to guarantee protection of the interests of absentee class members.218
There are statutory safeguards to this theory: Civil Code Section
1781(c) gives the court the authority, upon motion of any party to the
action, to hold a hearing to determine if the prerequisites of maintaining a class action are present.2 1 9 If the court determines that the claim
presented by the named plaintiffs is possibly prejudicial to the interests
of the class as a whole, or if it feels individual class members may have

additional claims which are still common to the class, 220 the court has
216. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S 306, 314 (1950).
217. 234 U.S at 394.
218. If the class action device is not used, the problems in the area of mass
consumer claimants against a single defendant will not disappear. For example, if an
individual consumer plaintiff sues a defendant for recovery of his individual damages, he
may also recover punitive damages by showing a course of conduct sufficient to support
the allegations of fraud. By showing a similar course of conduct by the defendant's
actions towards other consumers, the plaintiff is in effect outlining the class by showing
an ascertainable class and a community of interest-the present requirements for
defining a class sufficient to support a class action. If the plaintiff succeeds in his
recovery of punitive damages, as well as his individual damages, he may be considered to
have recovered from the defendant all the ill-gotten gains of the illegal activity perpetrated upon the class by the defendant. Therefore, when the next plaintiff in the class seeks
recovery from the defendant of his own individual damages and, again, punitive damages,
the problem of the punitive damages recovered by the first plaintiff arises. If those
punitive damages were intended as a means of recovery by the plaintiff of all the
fraudulent proceeds of the defendant's illegal conduct, should the second plaintiff also be
allowed to recover punitive damages against the defendant when, in effect, the defendant
has already been forced to give up his proceeds? If not, the second plaintiff's individual
damages, as is more than possible in a consumer fraud action, may be insufficient to
support an individual litigation, and thus none of the remaining plaintiffs will be able to
recover even their individual damages from the defendant. On the other hand, if the
second plaintiff can recover punitive damages from the defendant by again showing a
similar course of conduct towards the other "class" members, this would in effect punish
the defendant twice for the same series of transactions, which is beyond the scope and
purpose of punitive damages.
219. CAL. CODE Cry. Pnoc. §382 requires that there be an ascertainable class and a
well-defined community of interest among class members; see text accompanying notes
104-105 supra. See text accompanying notes 135-136 for the requirements of a class
action under CAL. Crv. CODB §1781(b).
220. See CAL. Cr. RuLEs, Manual for Conduct of' Pretrial Proceedings in Class
Actions, §427.6(a), at 20 (1974). In the hearing to determine whether notice is to be
ordered, the Manual allows consideration of the merits of the action only if relevant to
the issue of whether or not notice is to be given except for consumer class actions
brought under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CrV. CODE §1750 et seq. In a
consumer class action, the Manual requires that the hearing procedures of CAL. Civ.
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the power to order notice as a means of ensuring that the representation
is adequate. 2 21 If the court determines that notice should be required
to ensure adequate representation, as in Mullane, Section 1781 (d) gives

the court the discretion to order personal notification or notice by publication.222 In a consumer class action suit in which the class is huge,
the possibility that notice by publication will reach class members representative of all views within the class is increased, 3 allowing interested
members to present their views concerning the prosecution of the suit,

while keeping the expense of the action manageable. 24
If the court allows the suit to proceed to trial on the merits without
notice to the class, and binds the entire class by the resulting judgment,2 25 in the unlikely event that a class member with de minimis
damages wishes to sue separately for his claim, he may raise the issue

of lack of notice or adequate representation in a later proceeding to
attack the binding effect of the judgment. 226 Two of the major purposes
of the class action device would still have been accomplished, insofar

as the action would have served as a method of deterring and punishing
the defendant by recovering from him the gains of his illegal activity,

and as a method of obtaining redress for injuries to numerous small
claimants. Also, the possibility that a class member will bring a later
suit if not personally notified in the prior suit is so remote that for all
practical purposes the third major benefit, reduction of numerous suits
arising from the same act, can be said to have been achieved.

The possibility of foreclosing the class member's right to conduct his
own suit by extending the judgment to such a member without notice
CODE §1781(c) (3) be followed.

This section allows the court to consider whether or
not the action is without merit or whether there is any defense to the action, without
limiting such considerations to the issue of notice.
221. Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 550, 492 P.2d 1137, 1142, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 750 (1972). "Should the court conclude that the named plaintiffs may not
adequately represent the class, it should afford them an opportunity to amend their
complaint to redefine the class or to add new individual plaintiffs."
222. The court in Cartt v. Superior Court suggests that if notice by publication is
ordered, it should be "meaningful" notice which would have a "reasonable chance of
reaching a substantial percentage of the class members who do not while away their
spare time by browsing among fictitious name statements and notices of trustees sales."
50 Cal. App. 3d at 974, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
223. Comment, Civil Procedure-ClassActions-Amending Rule 23 in Response to
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 53 N.C.L. RaV. 409, 417 (1974).
224. Notice by publication has been found to be sufficient in a consumer class
action in which the class is huge and damages are de minimis. Cooper v. American Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 274, 285, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579, 585 (1976).
225. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940). In a class suit, "the considerations which may induce a court . ..to proceed, despite a technical defect of parties, may differ from those which must be taken into account in determining whether
the absent parties are bound by the decree. ....
"
226. Comment, Civil Procedure-ClassActions-Amending Rule 23 in Response to
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 53 N.C.L. REV. 409, 416 (1974).
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may be theoretically unacceptable to some, even though this right is, as
a practical matter, almost useless to the consumer who cannot afford
an expensive individual litigation to recover de minimis damages.
Therefore, if it is determined that some form of notice, as well as adequate representation, is constitutionally required before the judgment
may be extended to bind the entire class, the trial court should consider
whether the requirement that the judgment be binding on the entire
class should be a prerequisite to the bringing of the class action suit.
The possibility that class members with minimal individual damages
will desire to sue separately must be balanced against the possibility
that, absent a class action, the defendant will retain the benefits of his
illegal activity and there will be no redress for the class as a whole.
The continuing viability of the class action device as a means of consumer protection for those financially unable to obtain any other
method of redress, as well as a punitive and preventive device against
past and future injuries to consumers, requires the court to view the
class action not as a rigidly structured procedure, bound by requirements which only the economically powerful can fulfill. Rather, it
should be viewed as a practical, equitable means of controlling deceptive, fraudulent, and illegal business practices inflicted upon a group
which includes all society--consumers-and which has no other
weapon as effective or as feasible at hand. A rigid requirement that
the judgment resulting from the class action be binding on all class
members, when such a requirement may not only put the class action
out of the financial reach of the injured class but may also be totally
unnecessary from a practical viewpoint, would make the most effective
legal remedy the small claimant has almost useless. The greater
requirement is, instead, for "a system of law that dispenses justice to
the lowly as well as to those liberally endowed with power and
wealth. 227
CharlotteE. Hemker-Smith

227. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

